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WAIVER OF A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING
POST-ATTACHMENT INTERROGATION
EUGENE L. SHAPIRO*

I. INTRODUCTION

When the editors of this symposium requested a discussion of decisions
which were likely to be influential in the development of state constitutional law,
few cases touching upon a state right to counsel seemed to rival People v.
Samuels' and those pursuing the approach of State v. Wiegers.2 These
opinions, in their respective procedural contexts, address the issue of waiver of
a state right to counsel during post-attachment interrogation. The questions posed
in Samuels and Wiegers parallel some of the issues discussed in Patterson v.
Illinois,3 a controversial opinion in which the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
an unrepresented defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
interrogation required no more for a valid waiver than did the Fifth Amendment
doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona4 and its progeny. 5
Despite criticism of Pattersonby some commentators, Samuels and Wiegers
are not result-oriented, reactive responses to the Court's analysis there. Both
preceded Patterson, and Wiegers and similar cases addressed the rights of the
represented defendant-an issue distinguished and addressed only fleetingly by
the PattersonCourt.' These decisions are noteworthy because, while examining
the requirements of the right to counsel under their respective state constitutions,
they bring to bear considerations which are especially appropriate to a discussion
of state constitutional doctrine. Both Samuels and Wiegers involve regard for
ethical standards which, in the view of each court, are bound up with the scope
of the constitutional right to counsel afforded by the state. In Samuels, the New
York Court of Appeals went so far as to conclude that the presence of counsel

* Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis; B.A.,
Harpur College, S.U.N.Y. Binghamton; J.D., University of Virginia 1972; LL.M. (Cr. J.) New
York University, 1973.
1. 400 N.E.2d 1344 (N.Y. 1980).
2. 373 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1985).
3. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Paterson, 487 U.S. at 292-98.
6. Id. at 290 n.3.
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was necessary before an unrepresented defendant could effectuate a waiver.7
It is of course quite possible that the conclusions reached in these cases will be
found to be inappropriate in other jurisdictions as they consider their
constitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, the significance of these decisions will
continue to lie in the breadth of their concerns.
II. SOME BACKGROUND

The first American constitutional right to counsel appeared in the New
Jersey Constitution of 1776,1 against the backdrop of English procedures which
were viewed by the colonists as inadequate and irrational. At that time, English
law denied the full assistance of counsel to those accused of felonies other than
treason, but permitted the right to parties in civil cases and those accused of
misdemeanors. 9 Blackstone had criticized this anomaly as contrary to the "face
of reason, " " and a number of colonial laws broadened the protection to extend
to capital and other cases."

A provision of the Pennsylvania Charter of

Privileges of 1701 had required that all criminals "shall have the same Privileges
of . . . Council as their Prosecutors," 2 and it was this phrasing that was
reflected in New Jersey's guarantee. 3 By November of 1776, Delaware,
Pennsylvania and Maryland had provided for the constitutional right in all

7. People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1347 (N.Y. 1980).
8. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTIONS 452 (William F. Swindler ed., 1976) [hereinafter SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS].
9. An individual charged with a felony other than treason was permitted the aid of counsel only
for debate of a point of law. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349; Powell v."
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). Upon a charge of treason, the right of the accused to "make his
. . . defence, by counsel learned in the law," was afforded by the Trial of Treasons Act of 1696.
The Trial of Treasons Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.), reprintedin E. NEVILLE WILLIAMS,
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION,

1688-1815: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY EX.

COMMENTARY 53 (1960). The right to counsel was not granted with respect to all felonies until
1836. The Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114 (Eng.).
10. "For upon what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which
yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" 4 WItLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *349.
11. See, e.g., Virginia's Act of August, 1734 (chapter 7, § 3, Laws of Va., 8th Geo. 11,
Hening's Stat. at Large, vol. 4, p. 404); Pennsylvania Statute of May 31, 1718 (Dallas, Laws of
Pennsylvania, 1700-1781, vol. 1, p. 134). These provisions and others are discussed in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1932).
12. Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges of 1701, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 8, at 275.
13. "That all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of . . . counsel, as their
prosecutors are or shall be entitled to." N.J. CONST of 1776, art. XVI, reprintedin 6 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 452.
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criminal "prosecutions."' 4 A right to counsel was provided by the New York
Constitution of 1777, stating that a defendant shall be allowed counsel "in every
trial on impeachment, or indictment for crimes or misdemeanors. . .. "5 The
emphasis upon the provision of the right to counsel in all criminal
"prosecutions" in many of these early state guarantees was mirrored in the
language of the Sixth Amendment. 6
The determination of whether a criminal proceeding has commenced
continues to be significant under both Sixth Amendment and state constitutional
doctrine for purposes of ascertaining whether the right to counsel has attached.
The Supreme Court has long noted that the federal right attaches upon the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, "whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 7 While courts
have varied in the determination of when a state right to counsel attaches,' a
post-attachment interrogation is universally regarded as a procedure at which the
right must be honored."9 Constitutional doctrine surrounding the process of
post-attachment interrogation has, of course, developed simultaneously with the
evolution of separate constitutional principles involving the presence of counsel
during custodial interrogation as a protection against infringement upon federal
and state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. In Miranda v.

14. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIoHTS of 1776, § 14 ("That in all Prosecutions for criminal
Offenses, every Man hath a Right... to be allowed Counsel ..... ), reprintedin 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 198; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX ("That in all prosecutions for
criminal offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himself and his council .. .. "), reprintedin
8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 278; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art.
XIX ("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right.., to be allowed counsel..
"
reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 373.
15. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIV, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note
8, at 177. See also MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XII ("No subject shall be held to answer for
any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and plainly . . . described to him . . . and every

subject shall have a right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel, at his
election."), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 94; N.H. CONST. of 1784,
pt. 1, art. XV (having similar language as in Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, but omitting
phrase "at his election"), reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 8, at 346.
16. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ..
to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 688-89 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
18. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974) (right to counsel
attaches at warrantless arrest) with State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1980) (right to counsel
attaches upon issuance of arrest warrant).
19. In determining whether a post-attachment procedure is one at which the right must be
afforded under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has analyzed the issue in terms of whether
the procedure is a "critical stage." United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315-16 (1973). While most
states employ similar terminology, some have eschewed this framing of the issue. See State em rel.
Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d 904 (Or. 1982) (Lent, J., concurring).
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Arizona2' and its state counterparts, a right to the presence of counsel was
designed to dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation.
III. THE

SUPREME COURT'S VIEW UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

Before Patterson v. Illinois,2' it was widely believed that the standards for
the waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation would
be significantly different from the standard for the waiver of the derivative right
to counsel under Miranda. Much of the formative Sixth Amendment doctrine
had evolved in the context of surreptitious questioning and consequently no issue
of waiver was presented.' In the well-known case of Brewer v. Williams,'
however, the Court made it clear that waiver would be permissible, but
indicated that the standard for such waiver might be higher than that for the
Fifth Amendment right. 4 Williams, the defendant, had been interrogated in
a police car after an arraignment and consultation with his attorney.' He had
surrendered in Davenport, Iowa after he had been sought pursuant to an arrest
warrant for the abduction of a child in Des Moines.' The arraignment had
occurred in Davenport, and Williams' lawyer there had been denied permission
to accompany him while he was being transported between the two cities.'
A second lawyer represented Williams in Des Moines, and both attorneys had
been assured that no interrogation would occur during the trip.'
Instead,
Williams was subjected in the car to what the Court termed a "Christian burial
speech," an interrogation deliberately designed to elicit the location of the
victim's body." Rejecting the assertion that Williams had waived his Sixth

20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
22. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
23. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
24. Id. at 401-06.
25. Id. at 390-94.
26. Id. at 390.
27. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391 (1977).
28. Id. at 391-92.
29. Id. at 392-93. This interrogation was characterized by the Court as follows:
Detective Learning knew that Williams was a former mental patient, and knew also that he was
deeply religious. Addressing Williams as "Reverend," the detective said:
"I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
....
Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions ....
They are
predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only
person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there
once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And,
since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve
and murdered.. .."
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Amendment right to counsel, the Court noted that "[a]t no time during the trip
did Williams express a willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an
attorney. " 30 Rather, he had repeatedly expressed his intention to "tell. . .the
whole story" after speaking with his attorney in Des Moines.3 ' Citing Johnson
v. Zerbst,32 the Court stated:
The [courts below] were also correct in their understanding of the
proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as
a matter of federal constitutional law-that it was incumbent upon the
State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." That standard has been reiterated in many
cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon
a request by the defendant and that courts indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver. This strict standardapplies equally to an
alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical
stage of pretrialproceedings.33
The standard of Johnson v. Zerbst had been a stringent one in assessing the
validity of a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial. This
statement in Brewer appeared to indicate that, in contrast with the less
demanding standard for waiver of Miranda's Fifth Amendment right,' the
standard for judging a relinquishment of the Sixth Amendment right during
pretrial interrogation would be as rigorous.
This implication was repudiated by the Court in Patterson v. Illinois.35
In Patterson, the defendant, who had been indicted but was not represented by
counsel,' was twice read his Miranda warnings and twice incriminated

Id.
30. Id. at 392.
31. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977).
32. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
33. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
34. While the Miranda Court had cited Zerbst in its discussion of waiver, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), it was widely acknowledged by 1977 that Fifth Amendment analysis
employed a less stringent standard.
35. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
36. Id. at 288-89. At the outset, the Patterson Court expressly noted "as a matter of some
significance" that at the time he was questioned, the defendant had neither retained a lawyer nor
accepted one by appointment. It briefly added that "[o]nce an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set
of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes
effect" and "the analysis changes markedly once an accused even requests the assistance of counsel."
Id. at 290 n.3 (citations omitted).
Also relevant to a consideration of the prosecution's Sixth Amendment responsibilities towards
a represented defendant would be the Court's discussion in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
In Estelle, the Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when a
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himself. 7
The question of the adequacy of the waivers of his Sixth
Amendment rights was presented to the Court. In an opinion by Justice White,
the Court stated that since Patterson voluntarily answered questions after the
Miranda warnings without claiming his rights to silence or counsel and had also
executed a written waiver, the issue posed was "whether this waiver was a
'knowing and intelligent' waiver of his Sixth Amendment right. "3' The Court
found the Miranda warnings to be adequate in conveying the information
necessary to satisfy this standard, because Patterson was "made sufficiently
aware of his right to have counsel present during the questioning, and of the
possible consequences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel .
. 3" The
warnings communicated the fact that he had a right to consult with an attorney,
to have a lawyer present during questioning, and to have one appointed.
According to the Court, this constituted "the sum and substance of the rights
that the Sixth Amendment provided him. "' The Court stated that there was
"little more petitioner could have possibly been told in an effort to satisfy this
portion of the waiver inquiry.""'
It added that the warnings also made Patterson aware of the consequences
of his decision to waive his Sixth Amendment rights.42 He was informed that
his statement could be used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.43
"This is the ultimate adverse consequence petitioner could have suffered by
virtue of his choice to make uncounseled admissions to the authorities."" The
Court then observed:
This warning also sufficed-contrary to petitioner's claim here ... to
let petitioner know what a lawyer could "do for him" during the
postindictment questioning: namely, advise petitioner to refrain from
making any such statements. By knowing what could be done with
any statements he might make, and therefore, what benefit could be
obtained by having the aid of counsel while making such statements,
petitioner was essentially informed of the possible consequences of

psychiatric examination encompassing the issue of the future dangerousness of the defendant was
performed without notice to his attorney. Id. at 469-71. The Court specifically noted, however,
that Smith was not precluded from waiving this right. Id. at 471 n.16.
37. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 288-89.
38. Id. at 292 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938)).
39. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988).
40. Id.-at 293.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293 (1988).
44. Id. at 293-94.
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At footnote six, the

An important basis for our analysis is our understanding that an
attorney's role at postindictment questioning is rather limited, and
substantially different from the attorney's role in later phases of the
criminal proceedings. At trial, an accused needs an attorney to
perform several varied functions-some of which are entirely beyond
even the most intelligent layman.
Yet during postindictment
questioning, a lawyer's role is rather unidimensional: largely limited
to advising his client as to what questions to answer and which ones
to decline to answer.'
The Court found its conclusion concerning the adequacy of the warnings to
be supported by the inability of Patterson's counsel to precisely articulate what
additional information should have been provided. 7 It then added an
observation borrowed from its Fifth Amendment analysis: Once it is established
that there was no coercion, that the defendant was aware of his right to remain
silent and request a lawyer, and that he knew of the State's intention to use his
statements to obtain a conviction, "'the analysis is complete and waiver is valid
as a matter of law.'"'
Justice White also took the occasion to reject the notion that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel occupies a position "superior" to that of the Fifth
Amendment.49 In the context of this discussion, the Court elaborated upon the
distinction drawn in footnote six between the role of counsel at trial and his or
her "unidimensional" role at a pretrial interrogation:

[W]e have taken a

. . . pragmatic approach to the waiver
question-asking what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular

45. Id. at 294.
46. Id. at 294 n.6.
47. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294 (1988). Since Patterson had been informed of his
indictment, the Court did not address the question of whether an accused must be so informed before
a valid waiver. Id. at 295 n.8.
48. Id. at 297 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986)). The Court
acknowledged that in some situations a practice which would satisfy Miranda would not be
permissible in a Sixth Amendment context. For example, contrasting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986), it stated that the Sixth Amendment's protection of the attorney-client relationship would
not permit a valid waiver where a defendant was not informed that his lawyer was trying to reach
him during questioning. Similarly, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), the Court
observed that while non-custodial conversations do not implicate Miranda, they may constitute
impermissible interrogations after indictment. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296 n.9.
49. Id. at 297-98.
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stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could
provide to an accused at that stage-to determine the scope of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and
procedures that should be required before a waiver of that right will
be recognized.
* * ' [RIecognizing the enormous importance and role that an
attorney plays at a criminal trial, we have imposed the most rigorous
restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant,
and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting him to
waive his right to counsel at trial .... [W]e have defined the scope
of the right to counsel by a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of
counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to
the accused of proceeding without counsel. An accused's waiver of
his right to counsel is "knowing" when he is made aware of these
basic facts.
Applying this approach, it is our view that whatever warnings
suffice for Miranda'spurposes will also be sufficient in the context of
postindictment questioning. The State's decision to take an additional
step and commence formal adversarial proceedings against the accused
does not substantially increase the value of counsel to the accused at
questioning, or expand the limited purpose that an attorney serves
when the accused is questioned by authorities. With respect to this
inquiry, we do not discern a substantial difference between the
usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial interrogation, and
his value to an accused at postindictment questioning.
. .. Because the role of counsel at questioning is relatively simple
and limited, we see no problem in having a waiver procedure at that
stage which is likewise simple and limited.~'
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens framed the issue squarely in terms of
whether the Court should countenance unethical behavior by prosecutors and
their agents. 51 Citing both Disciplinary Rule 7-104 of the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility52 and Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of

50. Id. at 298-99 (citations omitted).
51. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined in this dissent. Justice Blackmun dissented separately. Id. at 300-01
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Disciplinary Rule 7-104 of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
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Professional Conduct,53 he stated that in a civil case the canons of ethics would
bar a lawyer from communicating with his or her adversary's client without
notice to the attorney or the permission of the court.' He added that an effort
to obtain evidence by thus "going behind the back of one's adversary" would be
a breach of ethics and manifestly unfair, and said that in the sphere of criminal
practice the same ethical rules and standards "at least as demanding" should be
enforced. 5 For Justice Stevens, the issue presented was one of determining
the point at which private interviews with the opposing party become
impermissible. In his view, even for the as-yet-unrepresented defendant "the
Sixth Amendment ... demands that a firm and unequivocal line be drawn at the
point at which adversary proceedings commence." 56
Justice Stevens criticized the Court for diminishing the significance it had
previously attributed to the initiation of formal proceedings. He recalled that in
Kirby v. Illinois,57 when denying a defendant the right to counsel at a show-up
which had preceded a formal charge, a plurality of the Court had observed that
the initiation of criminal proceedings "is far from a mere formalism. "'
It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal
justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself
to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government
and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself
faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed
in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. 9

(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so.
53. Rule 4.2 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1984) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES] provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
54. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 301. Today, the scope of the "authorized by law" provisions of
MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule 4.2 of the MODEL RULES is a matter of some controversy.
See the rule of the Justice Department concerning contact with represented parties, at 28 C.F.R.
§§ 77.1-77.12 (1995). For a discussion of this issue, see Ernest F. Lidge I, Government Civil
Investigations and the Ethical Ban on Communicating with Represented Parties, 67 IND. L.J. 549,
569-77 (1992); Jamie S. Gorelick & Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Justice Department Contacts with
Represented Persons: A Sensible Solution, 78 JUDICATURE 136 (1994); Samuel Dash, Justice
DepartmentContacts with Represented Persons: An Alarming Assertion of Power, 78 JUDICATURE
137 (1994).
55. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 303.
57. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 689.
59. Id.
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Justice Stevens added that this view was reiterated by the Court in United States
v. Gouveia" and Moran v. Burbine.61
Justice Stevens believed that the Court had grossly understated the
disadvantages of proceeding without a lawyer during post-attachment
interrogation. He noted that the warnings approved by the Court did not require
that the nature of the charges pending be explained.62 An attorney might
examine an indictment for legal sufficiency before submitting his or her client
to questioning.' A lawyer is also likely to be more skillful at negotiating a
plea bargain, a process which may be most fruitful before interrogation.' The
functions of an attorney, as well as the information which might be imparted to
the accused concerning those functions, will vary with the complexity of a
case.65
Even more fundamentally, in light of the shift in the relationship between
the state and the accused upon the initiation of formal proceedings, Justice
Stevens believed that neither Miranda warnings "[n]or for that matter, any
warnings offered by an adverse party" provided a permissible basis for allowing
prejudicial and unfair communication with an unrepresented defendant by
prosecutors and their agents.' Citing ethical standards which forbid attorneys
from giving legal advice to an adverse party who is not represented by a lawyer
(specifically, DR 7-104(A)(2))' he stated that "even the Miranda warnings
themselves are a species of legal advice that is improper when given by the
prosecutor after indictment."
They may lead the accused to misapprehend
the authorities' "true adversary posture. . . ."
That posture will inevitably
tend to color the advice offered, and such statements by a party "with such an

60. 467 U.S. 189, 189 (1984).
61. 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986).
62. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 308 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He noted that,
pursuant to Hendersonv. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), a court would insist on such advice before
accepting a guilty plea. Paterson, 487 U.S. at 308.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 307 n.4.
66. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 306-07 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(2) provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not ... [g]ive advice
to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel,
if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of his client.
Paterson, 487 U.S. at 309 n.6. See also Commentary accompanying Rule 4.3 of the MODEL.
RULES.
68. Paterson, 487 U.S. at 309.
69. Id.
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evident conflict of interest" create a public perception of unfairness.'
The apparent reluctance of the Court in Pattersonto cast the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment in terms of prevailing or acceptable ethical standards
was not surprising. It had earlier expressed a hesitancy to do so. In 1986, Nix
v. Whiteside7t presented the Court with the issue of whether an attorney's
refusal to cooperate with a client's imminent perjury violated the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 2 Under the twopronged standard of Strickland v. Washington 3 this involved a determination
of whether counsel's conduct was within the range of reasonably effective
assistance, as well as an examination of whether prejudice had resulted.
Strickland had noted that "[pirevailing norms of practice as reflected in
American Bar Association Standards and the like... are guides to determining
what is reasonable, but they are only guides." 7' Rejecting the claim of
ineffective assistance in Nix, the Court revisited this statement with the
observation that:
Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does
not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
.... When examining attoiney conduct, a court must be careful not
to narrow the wide range of attorney conduct acceptable under the
Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular
standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into a state's
proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional
conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts. 75
Such restraints imposed by the necessities of federalism do not limit the
interpretation of state constitutional guarantees.

70. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 310 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Commentators
who are critical of the Court's approach in Patterson usually highlight the narrowness of its view
of the attorney's role during interrogation.
See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 417 (1993); William T. Pizzi, Waiver of Rights
in the InterrogationRoom: The Court's Dilemma, 23 CONN. L. REv. 229, 250 (1991). For a
discussion of potential consequences for criminal investigation that constitutionalizing a preindictment no-contact rule as a matter of federal constitutional law might present, see Pamela S.
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to
Counsel, 105 HARv. L. REv. 670, 700-03 (1992).
71. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
72. Id. at 159.
73. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
74. Id.
75. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE REPRESENTED DEFENDANT

The constitutionalizing of ethical standards in the interpretation of a state
right to counsel is clearly reflected in several cases which address the issue that
was expressly reserved in Patterson:6 the issue of the propriety of postattachment interrogation of a represented defendant.
These cases pose
fundamental questions concerning the nature of a state constitutional right to
counsel: In light of the importance of the constitutional right to the assistance
of one's appointed or retained counsel in the context of a pending criminal
prosecution, does the initiation of an interrogation by a prosecutor or his agents
itself constitute an impermissible interference with that right? If so, is it because
it poses a threat to an ongoing attorney-client relationship? Is it because of the
need for advice and the adversarial position of the prosecutor? Finally, does
permitting a waiver by the accused without notice to the attorney or without his
consent so undermine the integrity of the process that it should not be permitted?
Courts which have found it appropriate to constitutionalize Model Rule 4.2
and Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) have addressed these issues only briefly or
implicitly. In State v. Wiegers,7 the defendant had been indicted for murder
and conspiracy and interrogated by prosecu.ors who knew that he had been
represented by an attorney on the matter giving rise to the indictment.'
Examining the scope of South Dakota's right to counsel' during postindictment questioning in the context of evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial,' the Supreme Court of South Dakota cited Disciplinary Rule
7-104 of the state's Code of Professional Responsibility!' The court found the
prosecutors' knowledge of Wiegers' representation to be sufficient to require the
imposition of the no-contact rule as a constitutional requirement of the state right
to counsel. "The protection afforded a criminal defendant by [the state right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination] must be held to be at least coextensive with that provided by the Code of Professional Responsibility to a
party in a civil action. " 2 Despite references to Massiah and other Sixth
Amendment cases, the court expressly stated that it was "offer[ing] no opinion"
concerning the scope of the defendant's federal rights.'

76. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988).
77. 373 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1985).
78. Id. at 3, 14.
79. The South Dakota Constitution provided that: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel. .. ." S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
80. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d at 12. Counsel had failed to properly move to suppress the
defendant's statement.
81. Statev. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 1985). The South Dakota Code of Professional
Responsibility incorporated DR 7-104(A)(1) of the MODEL CODE.
82. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d at 14.
83. Id.
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A similar conclusion constitutionalizing DR 7-104(A)(1) was reached by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Sparklin."4 It stated that implicit in the
right "to be heard by . . . counsel"85 secured by the Oregon Constitution was
the requirement that once criminal proceedings have been initiated and an
attorney is appointed or retained, "there can be no interrogation of a defendant
concerning the events surrounding the crime charged unless the attorney
representing the defendant on that charge is notified and afforded a reasonable
opportunity to attend."
The court cited the need for the "benefit of an
attorney's presence, advice and expertise,"87 and its view that "'it is unfair to
let skilled interrogators lure [a defendant] from behind the shield into an unequal
encounter.... Such interrogation subverts the attorney-client relationship.'"'
No waiver of that right was therefore permissible until the defendant had
consulted with his attorney. 9
In a more recent decision which arguably falls within this group of cases,
State v. Lefthand,9P-a case in which reliance upon a state constitutional right
to counsel is less clear-the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed the need for
the enforcement of a no-contact rule with exceptional vigor and reflected the
dynamics of a judicial decision to implement such a policy. Lefthand, the
defendant, had been arrested for murder, and a public defender was appointed
to represent him at an initial judicial appearance. 9' Soon afterwards, Lefthand
refused to leave his bed to speak with his attorney.' Out of concern over the
defendant's competence to proceed, counsel moved for a suspension of the
proceedings pending a mental health evaluation.'
While this motion was
pending, the police obtained a statement from Lefthand with permission from the
prosecutor and without notice to defense counsel.' This statement was used
as part of the prosecution's case. 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
on three prior occasions it had expressed its disapproval of such a practice "in

84. 672 P.2d 1182 (Or. 1983).
85. Id. at 1186 (quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 2).
86. Id. at 1187.
87. Id.
88. State v. Sparklin, 672 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Or. 1983) (quoting Note, Interrogationand the
Sixth Amendment: The Casefor Restriction of Capacity to Waive the Right to Counsel, 53 IND. L.J.
313, 315 (1977-1978)).
89. Id. The court added that as contact was restricted "in the smallest civil matter," it could
certainly require no less of prosecutors or police in criminal matters." Id. As a separate matter,
the right did not prevent a defendant from volunteering statements, nor did it foreclose questioning
about unrelated criminal episodes. Id. at 1187-88.
90. 488 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1992).
91. Id. at 800.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. State v. Lefihand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 800 (Minn. 1992).
95. Id.
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the strongest of terms,"" only to have its statements characterized by counsel
for the state as "mere dicta."' The court found it "incomprehensible that the
attorney-client relationship in the context of a criminal proceeding would be so
cavalierly disregarded." Citing the state and federal constitutional rights to
counsel,'
the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct," and its
"supervisory power," " the court held that the "in-custody interrogation of a
formally accused person who is represented by counsel should not proceed prior
to notification of counsel or the presence of counsel."' 0 1
Of grave concern to us here is what we can only perceive as an
emerging pattern of conduct, calculated to subvert the intent of our
criminal rules which [are] to "provide for the just, speedy
determination of criminal proceedings." In this case, the prosecution
allowed the in-custody interrogation. . . with full knowledge that a
competency examination had been ordered ... ."
Defendant's statement was subject to exclusion at trial."03 Despite the
ambiguous basis of Lefthand," 4 it is instructive in illustrating the policies that
can underlie the constitutionalizing of MR 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1). While the
ethical rules are generally found to be applicable to prosecutors in a criminal
proceeding," °5 they do not by themselves necessarily mandate the exclusion of
evidence unethically obtained.A06
In contrast, implementation of a
constitutional requirement flowing from a personal right of the accused carries
with it the appropriateness of an exclusionary remedy at trial. The suppression
of evidence will be viewed by some courts as yet another tool for deterring
prosecutorial misconduct and promoting the fairness of the process. Conversely,

96. Id. at 801 (quoting State v. Fossen, 255 N.W.2d 357, 362 (1977)).
97. Id. at 801.
98. State v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1992).
99. Id. at 801 n.6 (citing MINN. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 801-02.
102. State v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1992) (citations omitted). At trial, the
prosecution also improperly used statements made by the defendant during the course of the
competency examination in "plain violation" of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
103. Id.
104. For a helpful discussion of the ambiguities in the decision, see Edwin J. Butterfoss & Lisa
J. Burkett, Extending the Guiding LefIhand of Counsel: The Minnesota Supreme Court Provides
ProtectionAgainst UncounseledWaivers ofthe Right to Counsel During Interrogations,17 HAMLINE
L. REv. 307 (1993).
105. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 801 P.2d 1337 (Mont. 1990); In re Conduct of Burrows, 629
P.2d 820 (Or. 1981).
106. See, e.g., Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 1985); Henrich v. State, 694
S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Kan. 1982);
People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454-55 (Mich. 1979).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss2/7

Shapiro: Waiver of a State Constitutional Right to Counsel During Post-Att

1996] WAIVER OF A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

595

for some the costs involved in suppressing a potentially probative statement may
be too great. This may explain the rejection of the approach taken in Wiegers
and Sparklin by the Supreme Courts of Idaho,"°7 New Hampshire," and
Louisiana." ° Perhaps significantly, in State v. Decker, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire also held that any violation by the prosecutor of Rule 4.2 of the
New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct (mirroring Model Rule 4.2)
would not by itself result in the suppression of a confession."'
V.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT

New York has approached the rights of the unrepresented defendant against
whom criminal proceedings have commenced with the same concern that
Wiegers and Sparklin manifested towards those of a represented party. As noted
earlier, People v. Samuels"' preceded Justice Stevens' analysis in Patterson
by some eight years. For the New York Court of Appeals, the very
commencement of formal proceedings involves consequences which, under the
New York Constitution, preclude a waiver of the right to counsel during
questioning without counsel's presence." 2 In Samuels, the court held that the
defendant's right had attached upon the filing of a felony complaint and issuance
of an arrest warrant, and that the policies of its earlier opinion in People v.
Settles" 3 were applicable to the interrogation process." 4 As the court in
Samuels considered the matter "in litigation," it had reached a point at which
legal advice was crucial." 5 Quoting Settles, the court added, "'[o]nce a
matter is the subject of a legal controversy any discussions relating thereto
should be conducted by counsel: at that point the parties are in no position to
safeguard their rights.'"" 6
In Settles, the court had implemented a constitutional no-contact policy for
an indicted and unrepresented defendant who had been subjected to a corporeal
identification procedure. The court stated that "[t]he filing of an indictment

107. State v. Ruth, 637 P.2d 415, 418 (Idaho 1981).
108. State v. Decker, 641 A.2d 226 (N.H. 1994).
109. State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367 (La. 1995) (overruling State v. Hattaway, 621 So. 2d 796
(La. 1993)).
110. Decker, 641 A.2d at 230.
111. 400 N.E.2d 1344 (N.Y. 1980).
112. New York has also developed an independent state constitutional policy which entitles
some suspects to the presence of counsel when formal proceedings have not commenced. This
"Hobson line of cases" is distinguished from New York's post-attachment cases and discussed by
the New York Court of Appeals in People v. West, 615 N.E.2d 968, 971-72 (N.Y. 1993).
113. 385 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1978).
114. Sanmuels, 400 N.E.2d at 1345-46.
115. Id. at 1346.
116. Id. at 1346-47 (quoting People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 617 (N.Y. 1978)).
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constitutes the commencement of a formal judicial action against the defendant
and is equated with the entry of an attorney into the proceeding. ""' 7 After
discussing the value placed upon the right to counsel under the New York
Constitution, the court explained:
Once an indictment is returned against a particular defendant, the
character of the police function shifts from investigatory to accusatory.
For this reason, the warnings which are sufficient to comply with the
strictures against testimonial compulsion do not satisfy the higher
standard with respect to a waiver of the right to counsel. Prior to
indictment, there may be valid reasons why an uncounseled suspect
might wish to deal with the police. He may nourish the hope,
however vain, that he can avoid any legal entanglement by simply
clearing up a few loose ends. Alternatively, he may feel that by
getting into the good graces of the police as an informer he might be
able to avoid indictment and trial.
No such opportunity is afforded him once the Grand Jury has
spoken. At that point, there is no longer any inquiry into an unsolved
crime and the suspect is now the accused. He cannot make any
arrangement with the police which is not subject to the ultimate
approval of the court and there ought to be no necessity for further
police investigation. In a very real sense, the indictment represents a
method of commencing formal judicial proceedings ....""
Responding to these considerations, the court found that the principle of
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the ABA's Model Code served as an
"appropriate analogy.""" "The fact that defendant did not have an attorney
appointed at the time the police sought their waiver [was] a distinction without
a difference" as far as New York's constitutional right to counsel was
concerned. "
The court added that, "perhaps in the most 1 2 exigent
circumstances," a waiver without counsel present might be permitted. '

117. People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613-14 (N.Y. 1978).
118. Id. at 616 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 617. The court also cited Canon 16 of the Code of Trial Conduct of the American
College of Trial Lawyers. Id.
120. Id. The court added that the right to counsel should be dependent neither "upon the speed
with which an attorney can be retained [nor upon delay in arraignment and appointment]. To ground
an indicted defendant's right to counsel upon such fortuitous criteria is to debase that right into
nothing more than a race for the wary." Id.
121. People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 617 (N.Y. 1978). This might encompass a situation
where the interests of the defendant and his attorney are potentially adverse. See, e.g., State v.
Chandler, 605 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1980) (defendant wished to implicate his attorney).
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In State v. Sanchez,'" the Supreme Court of New Jersey endorsed a
similar policy which provided that, "as a general rule, after an indictment and
before arraignment," the right to counsel in the New Jersey Constitutiond
restrained a prosecutor and his agents from initiating a conversation with a
Defendant had been
defendant without the consent of defense counsel."
indicted, but was neither informed of that fact nor represented on that matter
when he was interrogated." While Mirandawarnings had been administered,
The court
the court found them insufficient to establish a valid waiver.
viewed the analysis of Settles as persuasive:
Once the indictment is returned, the State is committed to prosecute
the defendant . . . . Questioning the accused can only be "for the
purpose of buttressing... a prima facie case." The spotlight is on
the accused. Under those circumstances, the perfunctory recitation of
the right to . . .remain silent may not provide the defendant with
sufficient information to make a knowing and intelligent waiver.' 27
It added that Miranda warnings do not tell the accused the nature of the
charges, the dangers of self-representation, or the steps counsel might take to
protect his interests: steps including plea negotiations and such pretrial motions
as those testing the sufficiency of the indictment or seeking to suppress
evidence. 29 "Given the adversarial nature of their relationship, for the State's
representatives to communicate adequately that information to an indicted
defendant would be difficult, nigh to impossible."129
In addressing the matter, the court did not find it necessary to go "so far"
as the New York Court of Appeals. While Settles mandated that a waiver occur
only in the presence of an attorney, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
a waiver might also be valid if the defendant has been arraigned before a judicial
officer who has advised the defendant "that he has been indicted, the
significance of an indictment, that he has a right to counsel, and the seriousness
of his situation in the event he should decide to answer questions of any law
13
enforcement officers in the absence of counsel."

122. 609 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1992).
123. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have ... the assistance of counsel in his
defense." N.J. CONST. art. 1,para. 10.
124. Sanchez, 609 A.2d at 408.
125. Id. at401.
126. Sanchezv. State, 609 A.2d 400, 402-07 (N.J. 1992).
127. Id. at408 (quoting People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616 (N.Y.1978)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 408 (N.J. 1992) (quoting United States v. Mohabir, 624
F.2d 1140, 1153 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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Despite its discussion of the inadequacies of Miranda warnings, the court
apparently viewed this information as adequate in the judicial setting. Sanchez
also noted that ethical considerations supported its constitutional policy against
the initiation of a conversation by the prosecution. The court stated that New
Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibited a prosecutor from
seeking "to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights . . . .,,s' It also cited New Jersey's version of Model Rule 4.2,32
and stated that the implication of these two rules was that prosecutors and their
representatives should not initiate post-indictment conversations with an
33
uncounselled defendant.
The policy of Sanchez was reflected in the interpretation of the Hawaii
Constitution by an intermediate appellate court in State v. Liulama." Finding
it appropriate to adopt Sanchez's post-indictment and pre-arraignment no-contact
rule for the unrepresented defendant, 35 the court emphasized the stringent
requirements for waiver of counsel that had been implemented under the Hawaii
Constitution."
It added that, in its view, a defendant's decision to waive
counsel and answer questions during post-indictment interrogation "is tantamount
37
to a decision to proceed pro se. "1
It follows that, since our law requires the courts to carefully assure
itself of the accused's awareness of the circumstances of his situation,
his right to counsel, the value of counsel, and the dangers of
proceeding... pro se in the courts, the courts should also be required
to ensure that an accused had that same level of awareness at the time
he allegedly waived his right to counsel prior to a postindictment
interrogation .... '3
The court also stated that a defendant must be specifically advised by a court or
his own attorney "that he has a constitutional right to counsel at every stage of
the proceeding" before a waiver may be deemed valid. 139

131. Id. at 408 (quoting NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.8).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 845 P.2d 1194 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992).
135. "[W]e adopt the general rule announced in Sanchez that after a person has been indicted,
and before he or she has been arraigned, the government should not initiate a conversation with the
defendant concerning the charges against him without the consent of defense counsel." Id. at 1204.
136. Id. at 1202.
137. Id. at 1203.
138. State v. Liulama, 845 P.2d 1194, 1203 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Id. at 1204.
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In contrast, the approach of Samuels has been rejected under the Maine
Constitution. In State v. Carter,"4 the Supreme Court of Maine regarded a
no-contact rule as interfering with a defendant's right to self-representation.
If the accused may choose to undergo the ultimate determination of his
guilt or innocence having waived his right to the assistance of counsel,
he should not be denied that same freedom of choice to deal with the
government according to an intelligent assessment of his own best
interest at some other stage of the proceedings.''
It also stated that such a rule "would serve to exclude otherwise reliable
confessions, while adding nothing to the objective of deterring unlawful police
behavior. " 142 The court added that it had traditionally been reluctant to extend
rules of exclusion which detract from the truth-seeking function of the criminal
process. 43
VI.

CONCLUSION

It may well be that, in practice, the decision of whether to constitutionalize
the restraints of a no-contact rule will be determined by balancing the costs of
excluding potentially valuable evidence against the benefits of deterring
prosecutorial misconduct and furthering judicial integrity. This process, so
familiar under federal doctrine in assessing the appropriateness of judiciallycreated remedies,'" is hardly a satisfactory one for addressing so basic an
issue as the waiver of the substantive state constitutional right to counsel.
Ultimately, the question should be resolved by a careful examination of the
principles that underlay a state's guarantee of the assistance of counsel. How
exactly does the state constitution regard the needs of a defendant against whom
proceedings have commenced? Which of the many views expressed above
commend themselves in light of the state's own history, tradition and values?
(State constitutional principles are not, after all, fungible.) Are any differences
in treatment between the represented and the unrepresented defendant truly
justified by considerations presented by an ongoing attorney-client relationship,
or are they just the accidental by-product of current ethical rules? Finally, one

140. 412 A.2d 56 (Me. 1980).
141. Id. at 60-61.
142. Id. at 60.
143. Id. at 61.
144. Thus, for example, in determining the appropriateness of the exclusionary sanction when
there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that the question
"must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's casein-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence.. .." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
906-07 (1984). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-90 (1976); Oregonv. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 308-09 (1985) (determining the consequences of a failure to administer Mirandawarnings).
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cannot help but wonder about the validity of any gulf between acknowledged
ethical standards in this area and the parameters of a fundamental constitutional
right possessed by the individual for whose benefit, at least in part, those
standards have been promulgated. These issues are sure to be examined by an
increasing number of courts as they explore the dimensions of the state right to
counsel.
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